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This paper was conceived and written due to my alarm at finding students
in the Master's Degree and Ph.D. category, many from top universities,
almost devoid of the military history component of learning impinging
upon current Human Resources Management (HRM) problems in the Armed
Forces. The size of this monograph does not allow for an indepth look
at all of the services. Hence the paper centers on those historical
forces which created the U.S. Navy's need for people-oriented programs.
Since the aim and goal of the core course in HRM at the Naval Postgraduate
School is to bring the officer-students up to current realities and
processes of program promulgation, Part II is included. Where Part I
deals with the pre-Vietnam history and HRM efforts, Part II presents the
Post-U.S.S. Kittyhawk and U.S.S. Constellation (incidents which catapulted
the Navy into the negative-glare of the U.S. news media) HRM effort, its
program design and implementation methodologies aimed at HRM institutional-
ization, thus moving the U.S. Navy from the current, vulnerable-reactive -
posture to the 1 ess-vu 1 nerabl e-proact ive posture , required by the times.
It is hoped that this paper will aid in (1) dispelling rumors about
the program, (2) lessen the frustration of serious military leaders (due
to rapidity of social change and emotion laden-content addressed) and
(3) enable them to "buy-in" to the current HRM effort in a manner that
possibly extends their "leadership-reach".

THE U. S. NAVY'S HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS
IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE USS KITTYHAWK/CONSTELLATION RACIAL INCIDENTS
PART I
I. Introductory History:
Unknown to most present day Naval officers, enlisted personnel and lay
citizens the U. S. Navy was, initially, the most liberal of all American armed
forces, in early American history, with the exception of its officers corps
which remained basically lily white until WWII. The reason for this liberalism
was a wery pragmatic one. It took an unusual man to withstand two years before
the mast on a Windjammer. Such a man had to possess the physical, psychological
and genetic endowments needed for the rigors of life in the age of sail. The
qualifications were similar to those for slavery. Where sheer harshness is
concerned, life at sea and slavery were yery much akin. The similarity between
the two rested upon the fact that the ultimate method of compelling obedience
for both the black man and white man as well, was the cat o'nine tails. Sea
Captains were democratic in their sometimes diabolical cruelty and simply did
not give a tinkers damn about the color of the backs they whipped. Yet the
sea also furnished an avenue whereby the oppressed could become men in their
own right. If you were skilled in a craft in this exacting profession you
were respected. If you were an incompetent you were disrespected and your
color did not hide your lack. Consequently, the sea was always a place for
run-away slaves, white men on the lam and renegade Indians: U. S. Naval officers
in the early years, and indeed up to WWI , were a hard-headed practical lot.
If a man had the toughness and ability they simply said to hell with regulations
and Congress. Trying to obtain and keep a decent crew was an awesome job.
Before the closing of the frontier in the latter 1800's, sailors simply went
unauthorized absence and moved West if they became unhappy. Captains who needed
crews obtained them by the yery means verbalized by black militants in today's
ghettos--by any means necessary!
As an example the Army let racism retard recruiting and caused massive
defection of black slaves to the British during the Revolution:
George Washington as Commander-in-Chief of the Revolutionary Army
discouraged the enlistment of Negroes. Washington backed down when
Lord Dunmore issued a proclamation giving all Negro slaves their
freedom when they joined the British forces. Negroes ran away in
droves. Georgia lost, according to John Hope Franklin, 75% of its
15,000 slaves...
Thomas Jefferson estimated that in 1778 alone more than 30,000 Virginia
slaves ran away. Ramsey, the South Carolina historian asserted that
between 1775 and 1783 his state lost at least 25,000 Negroes.
This caused Washington to back paddle and 5,000 Negroes fought in the Revolution.
The Navy suffered no such problems because it ignored Washington's order. There
is no historical fact known to this writer that would indicate that the Navy
followed any course of rejection based upon color as a matter of policy until
the eve of WWI. Nor did they obey Congress when it restricted enlistment to
"able bodied white males" at the end of the Revolution and the period between
the Revolution and the War of 1812. This is substantiated by the factual
existence of Commodore Oliver Hazard Perry's correspondence with Commodore
Isaac Chauncy, whereby he was chided by Chauncy for negative remarks about
Negroes. 'on file in the Library of Congress
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These papers reveal that blacks
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with years of sea service were in the Navy at the start of the War of 1812,
many were aboard Chauncy's flagship, the Hartford. Nor did Naval officers
obey the racist edict issued after 1812 again restricting service in the Armed
forces to able bodied white males. This proof finds basis in the fact that
for the first and only time in U. S. history the I). S. Army fought a war that
did not contain a sizable black contingent. I speak of course, of the Mexican
War of 1845 and the U. S. quest for "Manifest Destiny." This would indicate
that the Army obeyed the restrictive order. There were, however, many black
sailors aboard the American ships that seized the Vera Cruz. It would appear
that hard-headed Naval officers had again ignored a racist edict issued from
above. Possibly two events in U. S. history set in motion the negative concepts
of race that led to the Navy's present problems. One of these was technological
and the other was socio-political in nature:
Technological : The "Battle of the Iron Clads" fought between the Merrimac
and the Monitor in Hampton Roads, Virginia in 1862 during the Civil War,
spelled death for the era of sail and ushered in the age of steam navigation.
Few blacks possessed the formal education needed to operate as lead-men
and Petty officers in the then sophisticated machinery divisions. Most
served as coal heavers in the new technology area up to the Spanish-American
War of 1898.
Socio-political : Southern whites chaffing under "carpet bag rule" and occu-
pation by the largest peace-time army in U. S. histroy flooded into the
frontier army and navy. These bitter men reached "Command Rank" by 1898
(Spanish-American War) and "Flag Rank" by 1915 (WWI) at which time they,
with humiliating memories of "Reconstruction," real or fantasied, took
revenge upon the hapless Negroes. They were given approval by President
Coolidge and further impetus by Woodrow Wilson who fired Negro civil
servants at Washington and segregated the few remaining messengers, janitors, etc,
In short, Naval officers took their cues from the top--their Commanders-in-Chief.
Ranking negro petty officers were beached after WWI to await the attrition of
retirement and incoming negroes who fought in WWI were restricted to the
Stewards branch (10,000 served).
Blatant discrimination was practiced against Negro servicemen as a
matter of policy and tended to pick up impetus in the aftermath of WWI as did
lynchings and other hate parameters in the U. S. , though Negro servicemen
served with distinction in France. The head of Sea Service, Secretary of the
Navy, Josephus Daniels, was not a friend of the Negro. The Navy stopped taking
Negroes as stewards in 1932 and only resumed enlistments when it became evident
that there were not enough Filipinos and Guamanians to man the two-ocean Navy,
projected on the eve of WWII. A trickle of Negroes was allowed again in 1934.
This writer entered the Navy in the first large contingent of Negroes
to enlist after the ban was lifted (1939-40). Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox,
a Tenneseean, was explicit in his determination that Negroes be restricted to
the Stewards branch (servants) along with orientals (Filipino, Chinese, Japanese,
Guamanians and dark Puerto Ricans). However, the advent of WWII (7 Dec 1941)
set in motion with dramatic suddenness, forces that surfaced the issue of dis-
crimination in the armed forces. According to John Hope Franklin, "Approximately
2five million whites were still unemployed in 1940" --the tail end of the long
depression of the 1930' s, when the U. S. activated the defense industry to
manufacture war weapons. Whites were hired first and Negroes were given only
what whites abandoned or didn't want (janitorial, etc.). The Negro leadership
viewed this with both anger and alarm:
In January 1941, A. Phillip Randolph, the President of the Brotherhood
of Sleeping Car Porters, advanced the idea of 100,000 Negroes marching
on Washington... By June, Negroes all over the United States... were
2
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making preparations to entrain for Washington. During the last three wee]
of June 1941 many things were done to prevent the march on Washington."
According to Lerone Bennet: "Asa Phillip Randolph is one of the most remark-
able Negro leaders in American history. His march on Washington gambit was
certainly one of the most brilliant power plays ever executed by a U. S. Negro
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leader," Randolph had been jailed in WWI for speaking out against Negro partici-
pation and had fought the railroads to a finish, earning the right to form the
International Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters. He was summoned to New York
City Hall in WWII where Fiorello La Guardia, Mayor of New York and Mrs. Eleanor
Roosevelt attempted to talk him out of marching on Washington but to no
avail. At this point Franklin D. Roosevelt summoned Randolph and two of his
most powerful supporters, Walter White (NAACP) and T. Arnold Hill of the Urban
League to Washington, according to Bennet:
"President Roosevelt sat behind his desk flanked by the Secretary of the
Navy and the Assistant Secretary of War. He was cordial but cautious.
He challenged the right of the group to put pressure on the White House.
He was doing the best he could and he intended to do more, but there must
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be no pressure; the march on Washington must be called off."
According to this eye witness account Randolph stood stubbornly on his grounds
and told the President that "Something had to be done and now!" Perhaps it
is this that accounts for Bennets label--"most unique black leader." He was
facing probably the most powerful and versatile politician America ever produced,
a man known to reward his friends and ruthlessly crush his enemies. But also
probably one of the greatest students of men that ever lived. Though Roosevelt
bristled for a moment he is said to have smiled and turned on his immense charm,
looked to Walter White of the NAACP, whom he knew and trusted and asked if
3




Randolph was bluffing and how many Negroes were really prepared to descend on
Washington, to which White replied 50,000 to 100,000. He then turned to
Randolph and asked, "What do you want?" Randolph told him that an end to
discrimination in war industries and the armed forces was a minimum that he
would settle for. On June 25th, 1941 the President issued his famous Executive
Order #8802 in which he said that "there shall be no discrimination in the
employment in defense industries or government because of race, creed, color
or national origin... and it is the duty of employees and labor organizations
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to provide for the full and equitable participation of all workers."
President Roosevelt's keen, analytical mind and his pragmatic action
stayed the march on Washington until the coming of the Negro revolt in the
1960's. Though Martin Luther King did the talking, Asa Phillip Randolph was
there, old and ramrod straight. Not 50,000 but 250,000 persons did march--
they represented white and black, Jew and Gentile and most ethnic groups. That
they had to march forms the basic reason why the military has a problem. After
#8802 was issued 3,000,000 Negroes registered for Selective Service and approxi-
mately 1,000,000 served. According to Franklin, 701,678 served in the Army,
165,000 served in the Navy, 17,000 served in the Marines and 5,000 in the U. S.
Coast Guard. The black race did not welch on its agreement. With the tales
of horror of the "Red Summer" of 1919 in the aftermath of WWI told to them by
their fathers and grandfathers of Negro soldiers lynched while still in their
uniforms still fresh in their memories, Negroes rose to the task of defending
the country. Roosevelt's orders were not obeyed. Instead, by "Gentlemen's
Agreement," white America retarded the effort and frustrated the Negro. The
result for the Navy was the first mutiny since 1842 and the destruction of the
seaward side of the Naval Magazine at Port Chicago, California, 17 July 1944,
5




which killed 250 Negroes, crippled the Pacific Fleet munitions effort and
caused the first mutiny in the Navy since the Somers mutiny of 1842. This was
due to Negro sailors being relegated to labor battalions instead of receiving
equal assignments at sea which destroyed their morale--they became careless with
ammunition. Negro servicemen dissipated massive energy fighting segregation
and discrimination. So thorough was discrimination practiced that the only
medals won were by mess boys. This persisted between WWII and Korea. On the
eve of the Korean War, A. Phillip Randolph was back in the fray! In an appear-
ance before a Senate Committee on 31 March 1948, he informed the group that
unless equality of treatment was forthcoming he would lead a massive boycott
urging Negro youth to refuse induction under the Selective Service act. Later
that year white barbers at the U. S. Naval Base in Charleston, South Carolina
refused to cut Negro sailor's hair. President Harry Truman issued orders to the
Navy telling the Commanding officer to "fire them" if they refused to cut any
sailors hair. Truman, on 26 July 1948, issued Executive Order #9981 directing
"equality of treatment and opportunity." The Navy moved on this order and
even moved toward desegregating the Stewards branch, traditionally the preserve
of Orientals, Guamanians and Negroes. In 1949 Wesley A. Brown was graduated
as the first Negro officer to complete studies at Annapolis (Negro officers in
WWII were trained at Great Lakes, Illinois). The Army winked at the order to
the extent that the 24tjn Infantry Regiment, based in Japan, remained segregated
and all black until the Korean War. This Regiment was rushed to Korea after
Communist North Koreans flooded across the 38th parallel and pushed illy trained
U. S. troops back. The 24th after a 16 hour battle won the first victory of
the Korean War on 21 July 1950 at Yechon. The 24th helped stabilize the American
battle line, fought with conspicuous gallantry, then died a moral death.
Bennet, Lerone, Before the Mayflower (see Landmarks and Milestones) p. 198,
The 24th became unreliable in the field. According to an article,
Walton H. Walker, Commanding General in Korea was in the process of disbanding
this Regiment that had lost its soul and will to fight. But Walker was killed
in an accident before he could act. General Maxwell D. Taylor who relieved Walker,
carried out Executive order 9981, desegregated the 24th[ and posted its Negro
soldiers to white units. By dispersing these troops in white units, Taylor
carried out the final act of administrative desegregation of the Armed forces.
These men's fighting capacity was restored and many went on to serve with dis-
tinction.
This paper is essentially Navy. Yet we form a social system and the
effects upon one unit cannot help but affect other components—in this instance
all Negroes in the services. It is for this reason some Army incidents are
included. Though Taylor did administratively end desegregation, ending the
virulent strain of racism in American life was beyond his capacity. Further,
the emergence of the "Negro Revolt," in the decades 1954 (Brown vs The Board
of Education) and 1974 (Watergate) placed a new force in the field of U. S.
Race Relations. The "glad to be heah"-type bourgeoisie oreo-type Negro is
becoming extinct and the Sambo, yassuh boss-type Nigger has nearly vanished as
a breed. The semantic word Negro is suspect and on the way out--being replaced
by Black and proud. In short the Negro race in the United States is in the
process of redefining itself and shedding the deleterious effects of being
defined by white America. There is a definite movement, psychologically, from
the negative, humiliating term "Negro" to the more positive term "Black" in
the Black world.
The two most potent terms in the Black segment of U. S. society today
are those of "Black Identity" and "Black Dignity." The Communist party received
its worst beating outside Russia at the hands of American Negroes because they
failed to deal with and understand the latency and need implied by these two
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terms. In recent history the Symbionese Liberation Army, officered in the main
by white middle-class radicals failed to acquire support from the Black community
because it failed to appreciate the underlying import of these some two terms.
The U. S. Army and U. S. Marines suffered serious racial disturbances during
the Vietnam War for the same reasons. Finally, as Vietnam wore on the Navy got
its lumps in form of riots and strike and mutiny on the major fleet units,
USS Kittyhawk and USS Constellation, 85,000 ton aircraft carriers.
Other forces as counterfail ing mechanisms retarding positive Black responses
to desegregation of the Armed forces and the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
My student officers are possibly more frustrated and angered more by
the lack of positive response on part of young Blacks than by any other factors
implied by functional Human Resources Management. Their frustration and anger
is understandable. It is painful and frustrating to remain cool while attempting
to assist Blacks while concomitantly having to deal with "Black rejection"--a
new twist as whites traditionally rejected Blacks--being referred to as a turkey/
honkey! This is made more painful when orders from above stipulate integrating
these same seemingly abrasive Black youngsters and other minorities into fight-
ing units as a focus of current Navy policy and the presence in the fitness
report of a new block for measuring one's ability to do so. Further, I find
most of my white students as "culturally deprived" as the Blacks and in many
instances more so. One can stand frustration and probably stay the surge of
anger if informed on the locus and reasons for the behavior of the antagonist.
This knowledge could possibly move a person from the vulnerable leadership
position of reaction to the more formidable position of proaction.
For sake of clarification lets look at some probable causes of negative
Black responses to Human Goals efforts on part of white officers and the services
1. Most white officers are culturally deprived in that most were fed a
pablum-type of history that ignored the Negro in most instances and usually
omitted the negative aspects of the Black experience in the U.S.
2. Black history was lost, stolen or allowed to stray (according to Bill
Cosby 's TV narrative) to the extent that most Negroes (they became Black
later) instead of learning and integrating their own history in the full
Century 1863 (Emancipation proclamation) to 1963 (the Negro Centennial of
Emancipation) most Negroes under the impetus of the Negro Revolt have had
their history, all 300 years of it, dumped into their consciousness in two
decades 1 954-1 974—a short time in which to silently philosophically
debate and integrate the life time experiences of a people.
3. The result has been one of shock born of too rapid an ingestion and a sense
of anger and betrayal by white America due to real knowledge of the sustained
brutally cruel assault promulgated upon Negro-Americans and implied by
the Black Experience in the U.S. The young Negro learns via this media
also, how faithfully Blacks contributed to this country's growth and died
in its wars which makes them ashamed that their forbears didn't demand
more dignity as human beings and men for that loyalty.
4. The foregoing is a painful knowledge that has caused Black America to
engage in a massive quest for a new positive Black Identity that has no
place for "Uncle Tom or Sambo." Most white officers tend to possess
little knowledge of what is implied socially or psychologically by the
human redefinition as imposed by the socio-political storm unleashed in
the two decades mentioned. Shocked by the violence done to their perceptions
of what formerly was expectations of Negro behavior (Negro submissiveness)
many can only perceive emergent Black behavior as threatening acts of
ungratefulness.
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5. The act of redefining one's self is fraught with psychic pain, frustration
and anger. When whites fail to understand the developmental process in
which the Black is engaged (becoming a self-respecting person) the vicious
cycle occurs. The behavior of the white is interpreted by young Blacks
struggling with the task of identity as "Those honkies don't want me to
become a person with a right to dignity and self respect." This phenomena
and its implied Black/White misunderstanding constitutes the material of
which race riots are made.
The Contemporary Historical Sources of the Negative Image of Naval Service in
the Black Community.
Down the American continuum of recent U. S. history a series of incidents
stamped, almost indelibly on the consciousness of Black America, a negative
image of U. S. Naval service. The effect upon the life and morale of those
Blacks who served was at once energy draining and humiliating; an egregious
existence at best. Unwanted by whites and sneered at by Negroes, Navy Stewards
lived amidst a constant assault upon their morale and often their persons.
As an example this writer, as a Navy Steward in the 1940's, was assaulted and
contemptuously treated by Blacks, out of ignorance, and whites due to racial
malice and hatred. Consequently, we fought three wars, not one. We fought
America's enemies at sea, red necks on the docks and ignorant angry Negro
brothers in the ghetto. That the negative image has not dissipated completely
can be drawn from this account by a white recruiter in North Carolina recently.
This officer student of mine was attempting to recruit a bright Black youngster
who seemed anxious to sign but evaded the final recruitment process. Finally
the mystery was cleared up when the youth arrived escorted by his aged aunt
who demanded "Is you white folks trying to make a cook out of my boy?" This
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recruiter had quite a time convincing this dowager that Blacks were no longer
recruited as servants only. She remembered the Navy-created race riot in
Washington, D. C. in WWI and the bad publicity about the Navy on the eve of
WWII over this issue.
In order to ascertain why Naval policy discrimination has seemed to
stick in Black consciousness longer than the Army who has had far more incidents,
let's look at a few incidents, as negative image makers.
1. Negroes were reduced to servants in WWI and the 10,000 who were recruited
served as Stewards and Cooks.
2. During the bloody "Red Summer" of 1919 in the aftermath of WWI, whereby
white America sought to put "uppity Niggers" who served in France back in
their traditional places, bloody riots occurred at Houston, Texas in September
1917 where the 24th Infantry (all Negro and the same one that died in Korea
in later years) after much mistreatment, demanded an end to harrassment by
local white toughs. White officers answered by disarming the regiment.
Under further provocation Black soldiers seized arms and killed 17 whites.
"With only slight pretense of a trial 13 Negro soldiers were hanged for
murder and mutiny, 41 were imprisoned for life and 40 others were held for
g
investigation." This was brutal era for Negroes in the civilian sector.
There were 19 verifiable lunchings and 12 probables in the state of Virginia
in 1918 according to the NAACP. 9
Riots occurred at Longview, Texas; Knoxville, Tennessee; East St. Louis,
Illinois; Chicago, Illinois; Omaha, Nebraska; Phillips County, Arkansas (city
of Elain) and Washington, D. C. Lynching spiraled in the southwest and midwest
8
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for more detailed account of the climate in this era.
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especially in Nebraska, Illinois, Indiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Texas,
Arkansas, Louisiana and the Carol inas. The race riot during the Red Summer
of 1919 that drew most national attention and placed the Navy in an extremely
bad image position occurred in Washington, D. C, the nation's capitol.
Southern whites poured into Washington in WWI . A lesser amount of southern
Negroes migrated also. President Woodrow Wilson's southern oriented policy
had displaced many Negroes in Civil Service. These Negroes went to work in
war industries and many got salaries over the white civil servants. According
to Arthur I. Waskow, the southern migrants were focused upon "Teaching any
fresh nigger his place." The Negroes were "determined to be free or win revenge
This exacerbated racial tensions within the city." The Negroes sense of
independence was strengthened by their service in France during the war. The
stage was set. Negroes were made "pawns" in a power struggle between two
powerful white men at Washington, Ned McLean, publisher of the Washington Post
and Major Raymond W. Pellman, Chief of Police. Waskow, in his report on the
causes of the riot states that:
"The Washington Post, then published by Ned McLean, was bitterly antagonistic
to the District of Columbia government and especially to the top command
of the police force. McLean especially objected to tough police enforce-
ment of prohibition . He began hounding the police through his newspaper
and in the summer of 1919 began to criticize them for not controlling a
crime wave of assaults and robberies. The Post kept the idea of a crime
wave alive by sensationalizing the usual summer crime statistics and
playing up ordinary cases of assault. Prominent among these were alleged
instances of attempts by Negroes to rape white women."
According to Waskow, on 9 July the Washington Branch of the NAACP sent a letter




Ibid. pp. 22-23 (underlining of prohibition was done by this author).
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that they were sowing the seeds of a race riot by their inflammatory headlines.
Only one newspaper answered—the Star--and acknowledged the justice of the
complaint. The next day however, the Times printed a news story emphasizing
the NAACP's interest in bringing to justice all Negroes accused of crime, and
leaving out its criticism of the tendency of the press to identify particular
12
Negro criminals with the entire Negro race."
As the tension continued to rise, people were arrested, mostly Negroes,
in some alleged rape attempt cases only to be released for lack of evidence.
McLean attacked the police for laxity in doing their job. This is probably
the source of the blackest mark that history records on the Washington Post's
record. (It was this paper that recently exposed the Watergate break in.) It
was placed there on 19 July 1919. This involved a shaky case of alleged assault
which the Post printed in bold black headlines—NEGROES ATTACK GIRL... WHITE
MEN VAINLY PURSUE. The body of the story described an attack in which two
negroes jostled a secretary on her way home, tried to seize her umbrella and
frightened at her resistence to their insulting actions fled... The incident
reported in the Post on Saturday morning bore deadly fruit on Saturday night.
The girl attacked was the wife of a man in Naval aviation.
According to Waskow, John Hope Franklin and also the NAACP, a mob of
sailors and Marines in excess of 200 decided to avenge the slight to his and
their honor by lynching the two Negroes suspected of the attack but released
by the police, probably due to insufficient evidence. The sailor and Marine
mob marched into southwest Washington (heavily populated by Negroes) beating
every Negro they found in the street—men and women. A riot squad finally
dispersed the mob. Two white Navy men were arrested and eight Negroes were
also arrested and held for investigation—Negroes were arrested for being
caught and assaulted! A howl went through the Negro community. Waskow says
12
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that... "Although the eight to two arrest rate might be imagined to have
indicated a higher rate of law breaking by Negores , it is hard to avoid con-
cluding that the unneutral behavior of the police had much to do with the Negro
attack on them and with the later increase in violence from both Negroes and
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whites," The Negro Community armed themselves for the certain rise in vio-
lence to come on the next day.
On Sunday morning the NAACP got in touch with Josephus Daniels, Secre-
tary of the Navy, and entreated him to restrain his Marines and sailors. He
could have done so with a simple order restricting all sea services personnel
to their bases. Though Daniels was warned of more serious clashes by NAACP
officials he took no action, according to his diary he felt that Negroes were
at fault anyway. Instead of the Washington Post tempering its inflammatory
statements McLean behaved like a "bullgoose-loony. " Negroes and whites fought
all over Washington commencing at 10:00 pm until the wee hours of the morning.
Negroes, though vastly outnumbered fought back when a mob of sailors and
Marines marched up Pennsylvania Avenue beating Negroes. The riot flared outward
from Pennsylvania Avenue, over down town Washington where armed Negroes shot
it out with policemen, soldiers, Marines, sailors and civilians. On Monday
morning McLean in reporting Sunday night's violence probably committed the
most irresponsible act of any major newspaper in the journalistic history of
this country, by adding the following paragraph:
"It was learned that a mobilization of e^jery available serviceman stationed
in or near Washington or on leave here has been ordered for tomorrow evening
near the Knights of Columbus hut on Pennsylvania Avenue between 7th and 8th
Streets. The hour of assembly is at 9 o'clock and the purpose is a "clean-
up" that will cause the events of the last two evenings to pale into






A stunned Negro community and finally an angered group of District officials
condemned the Post for this act. Though the act itself went far past "yellow
journalism" into the sphere of criminality, as no military orders had been
issued, McLean was never brought to trial. The rest is history. Negroes
organized and not only fought back but attacked. They used cars full of armed
men to carry out "lightning type raids" into white districts—armored cavalry
tactics were used. They stoned streetcars and autos, engaged in running gun
battles with white armed cars and one gang of Negroes were dispersed just
before it reached the gates of Washington Navy yard.
One faction wanted the President to declare Martial Law. District
Commissioners turned this down, probably sensing possibilities of a "blood
bath." The ultra conservative George Washington Post of the American Legion
many of whom knew Negro soldiers who fought in France came out with a condemna-
tion of sailors and Marines being allowed to degenerate into mobs who attacked
Americans. A Florida congressman said that failure to apprehend Negro assailants
of white women caused the riot. A New York congressman demanded that the Army
Navy and Marine Corps restrain their men from mob participation and was assured
this would be done by high-ranking officers. Herbert J. Seligman of NAACP's
National office in New York came in on a fact finding mission and condemned
both the armed forces and the police department. He demanded that the War and
Navy Departments take action.
Under widespread pressure from the same element in Congress and the
District, Wilson called in the then Secretary of War, Newton D. Baker, Secretary
of the Navy, Daniels, General Peyton, March, U. S. Army Chief of Staff and the
police chief. These were ordered to bring in additional troops from Fort Mead,
Maryland, Quantico, Virginia, and sailors from two ships lying at anchor in
the Potomac River. All were placed under General William G. Haan who ordered
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troops into all Washington areas. Haan also talked with New York area
commanders about more troops. Mounted cavalry charged about the streets, on
call at any information concerning hot spots. By Monday night 2000 Federal
troops plus 600 Washington policemen were on duty. All were admonished to
enforce the law equally. Policemen had lost credibility. The neutrality of
Federal troops backed by a driving rain prevented further bloodshed and stopped
the riot.
This was not the only incident during the Red Summer of 1919 that
involved U. S. Navy sailors. The participation of sailors in the Chicago riot
involved servicemen stationed at Great Lakes Naval Training Station Their
beating, injuring and killing Negroes caught in the down town Loop in the
Chicago riot was given wide publicity by the Chicago Defender , the most widely
read Negro newspaper in the country's Negro community with the possible excep-
tion of the Pittsburg Courier . Ironically, the only city in the United States
that administered justice equally and protected Negro citizens and whites alike
was Charleston, South Carolina. Of the alleged 25 riots during the Red Summer
of 1919 one must really understand the real anatomy of the Semantic term riot.
Looking closely many of these were "expanded lynchings." Charleston, South
Carolina and Longview, Texas were the first two real riots to erupt on the
national consciousness. They were different in that local people fought each
other at Longview--they merely happened to be black and white. At Charleston,
literally a foreign element, in the form of out of town servicemen, sailors
from the Charleston Naval base triggered violence with the city's Negro
citizens.
In 1919 Charleston had approximately 100,000 people of which 60% were
Negroes, many with meaningful relationships with whites that dated from the
Civil War. This probably accounts for Charleston's unique capacity to deal
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effectively with the riot. Policemen were not partial to whites and the
Military Commander took decisive action. Arthur Waskow says:
"The outbreak began in the evening of 10 May 1919 with a streetcar alterca-
tion between a Negro and two sailors on Saturday night liberty. The Negro
was shot and killed and a series of fights broke out between other Negroes
and sailors, with guns and clubs being used on both sides. Charleston
police arrested the sailors who fired first and attempted to clear the
streets. But sporadic fighting spread, hundreds of sailors joined in a
march toward the Negro district of Charleston. They captured, beat and
shot several Negroes along their route, looted shooting galleries for rifles
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and ammunition and attacked stores owned by Negroes."
At this point police, realizing that they had lost control called the Command-
ing officer of the Navy base. Around midnight according to Waskow, "Marines
arrived to act as patrolmen and were armed with riot guns to hold back the
mob. Fixed bayonets proved sufficient, however, to stop the sailors march.
Marines ordered all sailors back to the Navy Yard and trucks, streetcars and
taxi cabs were used to send them back to their bases and ships. Negroes began
sniping at returning sailors, and police and Marines ordered all Negroes off
the streets."
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Unlike the indecisive racist oriented dilly-dallying at Washington,
D. C, senior Naval officers moved quickly to head off any acts that might
exacerbate the violence. All sailors liberties were cancelled. The Mayor
of Charleston also rose to new heights for an American official of this era.
Where officials at Milwaukee, Wisconsin allowed two Negroes to be hung by a






wallowed in timid indecision the Mayor of Charleston told the city in no uncertain
terms that he would declare Martial Law and that aggressors of any color would
be punished. He also urged the Navy to compensate those Negro businessmen
whose stores were looted or damaged by sailors. A coroners jury convened several
days later and placed the blame on the sailors and exonerated the Negroes who
fought back in self-defense, an unheard of thing in this era. Pushed by the
NAACP the Navy Department ordered an investigation. The U. S. Naval Board of
Inquiry ordered arrested a number of sailors, as instigators of the riot. Six
were given General Court Martials, the charges being Conduct to the Prejudice
of Good Order and Discipline and Manslaughter. All were convicted.
The Charleston incident is what has caused me to rely so heavily on
Arthur I. Waskow's book. This positive action by the Navy is not mentioned in
the Negro Reference Book, nor Myrdal's classic, An American Dilemma . Nor does
either the authoritative works by Lerone Bennet and John Hope Franklin give
but salutary note of the incident. Neither does John D. Hicks, Richard
Hofstaldter, Henry Steele Commages and Samuel Elliot Morrison (the latter are
Pulitzer prize winners) give any semblance of the importance of this incident.
It appears that modern Black historians and white ones are grossly guilty of
errors of omission which has contributed to the cultural deprivation of Blacks
and whites alike. At a time when the Armed Forces needs any and all positive
historical image media available, perhaps historians should look for these
tidbits in their dusty bins and forgotten journals.
Another serious error made today by Human Resources Managers rests in
the fact that many find the odium of young Blacks as pertains to the "real
history" of this country, as opposed to the "pablum histroy" which they were
taught, too painful to deal with. In response they engage in two forms of
behaviors, both doomed to failure on the basis of unreality. The first group
includes many of my students (these usually recant on becoming better informed)
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who say, "That's irrelevant; what's past is past." On close questionning my
students become defensive and say, "I'm interested in today, not yesterday,
I never enslaved or lynched any Negroes." What they are really saying is, "I
wish that this part of American history would go away." It is not what is
said that alarms me, as an instructor and former enlisted man, it is what is
left unsaid that contains reactive rather than proactive content. What is left
unsaid is, "Why don't Negroes stop yelling about being Black and assume the
former humiliating, obsequious stance in the Negro-White relationship and
there won't be any problems." Tragically this silent assumption of Negro
willingness to do so seldom weighs the cost to the young Black of stepping
backward into his former historical Uncle Tom/Sambo role, which I doubt he
will ever again do. Nor does it weigh the cost to fighting units of having
personnel with little or no morale for serious leaders to tap. If the young
Black of military age learned anything from the "Negro Revolt" it was that
bootlicking, cringing behavior never dignified any of his ancestors! Conse-
quently he is not about assuming the former behavior of his forbears. This
group reacting to their discomfort tends to blame the victim rather than the
oppressive forces creating the problem.
The second group tends to engage in the pseudo-liberal action of
ultra-understanding. This group instead of seeking out historical incidents
like that at Charleston, often unwittingly aids and abets the negative behavior
of the young Black in the throes of the Black Identiry crisis and though well-
meaning, assists him toward self-destruction of his Naval career and his
psychological development effort which causes him to be discharged as unfit,
to become another bitter criminal element in the nations ghettos. Unfortunately,
one cannot "leap pages" of history or wish them away as if it did not happen.
That this was attempted has created the negative force in Black-White relations.
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What is needed is not "White guilt" or "Black animosity" and implacability
but sound programs aimed at dealing with problems rather than symptoms so that
we may get on with the serious business of defending this Country. When one
adds to the Navy's negative incidents, the "Port Chicago Mutiny" and others
known to this writer that occurred in WWII iueei are secreted in dusty reports
in Naval archives one should be gratified that White men and Black men dare
to trust or respect each other or that Kittyhawk and Constellation was so long
in erupting and spotlighting the need for serious consideration in this area.
It is a fact of history that of the seven major race riots and eighteen
minor ones in 1919, the U. S. Navy's sailors triggered two of the most publicized
and were highly visible in another. Further the Navy was the most vulnerable
of the major services race-relations-wise on the eve of WWII and was made a
focus of assault by the Negro Press. There is scarcely a Black family in the
U. S. in which the grandfather, father or older aunts or uncles do not have
stored away in their black consciousness something negative that they often
read in the Negro papers about the Navy. It is these that Navy recruiters
must convince in order to compete successfully for the cream of young Black
recruits.
One other item and we can move on to actual programming and its
processes. This is probably the brightest, best informed group of young people
the U. S. has ever produced. I do not mean that there are large amounts of
wisdom, this comes with age in most instances. They are also the most cynical.
Unlike my generation, who had to depend on radio (audio), these youngsters had
the boob-tube (TV). They saw the turbulent decades (1954-1974) unfold in all
of the violence, heart break and broken promises. As further countervailing
forces impinging upon recruitment, retention and service morale, they have
witnessed Vietnam and Watergate which, in a great measure, has validated their
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mistrust and cynicism. Elders and leaders have suffered severe loss of
prestige and credibility. William Ryan has said:
"Despite years of marches, commissions, judicial decisions, and endless
legislative remedies, we are confronted with unchanging or even widening
racial differences in achievement."
The net effect that this has, not on the Black alone, but other
awakening minorities and young whites as well (Indians, Mexican-Americans,
Puerto Ricans and Orientals) is that of being pushed, insidiously further into
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a state of Anomie (normlessness) as their lifegoals seem to recede instead
of drawing nearer. The Navy, in particular, and every American should be
grateful that the service and the country spawned an Admiral capable of seeing
this dangerous problem. Admiral Zumwalt not only correctly analyzed the problem,
he exhibited the courage, toughness and intellect necessary to set in motion
programs capable of movement toward solution—an act that had been avoided or
"played with" by other CNO's for 54 years.
As a Black mess boy and later Master Chief Steward, and still later
a Community Organization Specialist and teacher let me say that for the first
time in my 35 years of connection with the Navy, that I am finally allowed to
be genuinely proud of my service— something denied me for the 21 years that I
served. For a cynical, militant Black such as this writer, to be moved to
admiration by a Navy Human Resources Management program, after witnessing the
failure of Presidents Roosevelt's and Truman's attempts at integration fail,
required this program to undergo detailed scrutiny.
Ryan, William, Blaming the Victim
,
New York, 1971, Vintage Books. (The author
has intentionally left pages out of footnote. He feels that all Americans
should read the book.)
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Merton, Robert K. , Social Structure and Anomie , Bobbs Merrill Pamphlet
Series.
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In a recent survey of attitudes towards the armed forces branches,
Black Americans perceived the U.S. Navy as the most discriminatory and racist
of all branches (Army, Airforce, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard). I am certain
that this program, if its present design is carried out, will dissipate any
lingering negative image. It is hoped that this brief historical monograph
will assist serious military leaders in:
1. Understanding some of the root causes of racial and ethnic problems
confrontinq today's naval leaders.
2. Enabling leaders to deal positively with their own frustrations (legitimate)
at the seeming slowness of the responses of U.S. minorities to the current
Human Resources Management effort now in progress in the Navy.
3. Realizing that Human Resources Management knowledge and program evolutions,
as instruments for building moral and group cohesion, are as important to
combat readiness (a ship is as good as the crew who man her), as those
involving engineering, ordnance, etc.
4. The importance of positive Human Resources Management programs in creating
a cl imate within the commands in the Navy capable of attracting and re -
taining the increasingly scarce young men and women of the calibre needed
to man modern naval combat units.
The last statement (4) is in its first critical stages now!
The two Rs, Recruitment and Retention will , from the best available
forecasts, become ul tracri tical in the 1980' s due to an extreme scarcity of
military age-bracket young people in the United States (the trend is toward
smaller families). That branch of service which fails to do its HRM homework
in the lead time afforded by the less than three remaining years of the 1970's
will, in the greater degree of probability, find itself badly incapacitated
as a competitor for scarce recruits in the 1980' s. There is certain to ensue
a "war of all against all" among the services for these eligibles. Further,
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poor recruitment and retention efforts by a service is almost certain to
cause the service involved to experience the most "negative scrutiny" of
congressional appropriation committees. Adding validity to this assertion
are certain economic and sociopolitical facts. For examples:
1. Manpower and military retirements benefits have surpassed "hardware"
(planes, ships, tanks, weapons systems, facilities, etc.) in cost to the
extent that these are taking 55% of the U.S. defense dollar. Congress has
been forced to look more closely at military expenditures.
2. Quantitatively : Failure to acquire enough recruits results in overwork of
crews and undermanning of ships and plane squadrons, resulting in bad
command climate, lowered retention rates, and spiraling manpower costs.
Qualitatively : The complexity of current military hardware demands a
certain percentage of the cream of the recruitment pool available.
Positive command climate and fairness of treatment will probably be a
major determinant of the Navy's ability to attract and retain its share
of this type of recruit.
3. The services' human relations problems are not any longer centered in the
basically clear-cut Black/white sphere of issues. Human relations has
become multidimensional and increased in both importance and complexity
and now goes beyond Black and white into sex, new life styles, drug and
alcohol abuse, etc.
4. The services as a result of the long, unpopular, costly war in Vietnam,
have acquired positions of "high social and political visibility," and
consequently more intense "news worthiness" along with current "anti-
military" sentiment in the broader society. It logically follows that the
service which fails at positive management of its human resources con-
comitantly increases its vulnerability in areas encompassing damage to
image, loss of broad-based public and political support, adequate
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appropriations needed for combat readiness and capacity to recruit and
retain top personnel.
If the foregoing is really grasped with clarity, it should also logically
follow why the U.S. Navy is in the human resources management business, f-'or
sake of further clarity, I address this to those officers, warrant officers,
chiefs, and petty officers who for personal reasons born of brittleness or
prejudices have failed to "buy in" to these programs: "Try it; you might
like it." Many of you are very skilled and committed people. It would be a
tragedy for both your service and yourselves, as well as your country, if
you fail to exhibit the capacity to participate intelligently in this criti-
cally needed program.
Before moving on to Part II and the program process section, allow me to
state a simple but relevant reality: "The Navy is not spending money and time
on this massive effort in order to play 'Big Daddy' or make social workers or
'bleeding hearts' of its leaders." Naval leaders are intelligently directing
the service in the areas of change necessary for its survival as a decent and
fair place for all servicemen and women in order to remain a viable force in
defense of this country. This generation of naval leaders may have surpassed
all of the other services in designing and implementing "people programs." The
promulgation of such programs rests on your shoulders. You have the bone. If
you are a committed professional, all that is needed is that you take it in your
teeth and run with it. Probably one of the great reservoirs of fighting men left
untapped in this country resides in its ghettos, barrios, on the Indian reserva-
tions, in Appalachia and the rural areas of the South and Midwest. It is time
that we see these Americans as assets rather than liabilities. These people did
not run off to Canada to avoid the draft when their country called them . Human
Resources Management programs insure that these people who were formerly rejected




THE U. S. NAVY HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT PROGRAM:
INITIAL AND CURRENT EFFORTS
PART II
The U. S. Navy seems to have a head start on the other services in the
area of humand resources management as its current program probably comes nearer
to meeting the criteria of the organizational development process than other
services. The foregoing chapter attempted to bring the persons up-to-date who
may not have been familiar with the historical and socio-political events under-
lying the present HRM effort. This is based upon the wery real assertion, "If
an organization doesn't know where it came from, it will probably experience
problems in ascertaining where it is going."
prelude to Kittvhawk /Constellation Racial Incidents.
Contrary to press reports and subsequent hearings implying neglect
and permissiveness in this area, the Navy possessed a myriad of programs whose
focus was on equal opportunity and race relations long before the shipboard
blow-ups that caused the nation to focus on these problems. As an example,
the Kittyhawk incident did not occur until 12 October 1972 and the Constellation
incident did not come to public notice until November of that year. Secretary
of Defense Melvin Laird held meetings based upon the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and the subsequent additions to that act implied in the Civil Rights Act of
1968. He asked for and got the approval and signitures of all of the Secretaries
of branches of service on the document entitled HUMAN GOALS CREDO 18 August
1969, three years before the Kittyhawk/Constellation incidents, Secretary of
the Navy John Chaffee issued through his Assistant Secretary for Manpower and
Reserve Affairs, James D. Hittle, SECNAVINST 5350. 6A, superceding SECNAVINSTS
5350.1, 5350. 2A and 5350.6. He thus consolidated the myriad of fragmentary
directives and issued a codified set of guide lines for the Navy Equal Opportunity
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effort at the policy level. In this document the Secretary delineated policy,
objectives, goals, and the responsibilities of commanding officers and methods
of processing complaints. In reminding commanding officers of the fact that,
directives, as such, were incapable of insuring equal treatment the Secretary
cited the fact that President Truman had issued Executive Order #8891 in July
1948. His implication was clear as the problem of inequality was still around.
Though Chaffee placed the awesome responsilibity for equal treatment
of service personnel squarely upon the shoulders of commanding officers he also
gave them the clout needed to deal decisively with external countervailing
forces (such as housing and public places who discriminated against Navy men)
that were formerly beyond their authori ty--power to act against other institu-
tions in the broader social environment beyond the borders of Naval installa-
tions! Chapter two of SECNAVINST 5350. 6A, dealing with off limits sanctions
implied that a commanding officer required "Secretarial Approval" in order to
exercise off-limits powers as sanction in cases of racial discrimination. This
effectively tied a commanding officer's hands. On 27 May 1971 the Secretary
issued ALNAV 27/71 which stated:
1. Cancel that portion of paragraph #207 Ref. A which implies a require-
ment for secretarial approval for use of off-limits sanctions in cases of
racial discrimination. Local commanders both overseas and in the United
States are hereby delegated authority and responsibility to impose off-li ;,:its
sanctions in appropriate cases of racial discrimination as they do in cases
of vice, brawling, unsanitary conditions and the like after all other
reasonable efforts have proved unavailing.
2. Local procedures for imposition of off-limits sanctions in such cases
should parallel those used for other off-limits declarations.
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It is a fact that contrary to adverse press reports those officials
charged with the formulation of Naval policy had, long before the Kittyhawk
and Constellation incidents, moved positively in their efforts to secure for
each member of the Navy Equal Opportunity as pertains to fair treatment,
assignment and promotion.
On the military side the same applies if we look closely at Admiral
Elmo R. Zumwalt's tour of duty as Chief of Naval Operations. Here we find
intense civil strife in the broader society, but no lack of action aimed at
countering the adverse effects upon the Navy. Elmo R. Zumwalt, as CNO, was a
"stormy petrel" in a traditionally conservative position. This probably
intensified his "newsworthy appeal." Though he was, possibly, the most con-
troversial Admiral to ever head the Sea Services he did exhibit the daring and
courage needed for the times. In moving on the race relations area of Human
Goals he tackled a problem that had been carefully avoided by CNO's since 1919.
Admiral Zumwalt, in a speech at the Naval Postgraduate School in 1974, after
his retirement, admitted that some mistakes were made in trying to implement
the Human Goals programs. To a question posed by a student "If you had to
do it again would you still have proceeded as you did?" Zumwalt replied, "Yes,
one must start somewhere. I would, however, do a better job of tooling up
(training people and testing program impact) before actually implementing
programs." In issuing Z-Gram #66 in December 1970, all commanding officers
were so informed of the CNO's aims and goals—the eradication of discrimina-
tion in Navy life. This was followed in August by Z-Gram #14 and in September
Z-Gram #24. (Note: fiscal rather than regular calendar dates probably accounts
for 66 appearing before 14 and 24.) In January 1971 he established a Multi-
Racial Advisory Council for Race Relations and Minority Affairs to develop and
monitor policies and programs. Prior to the Kittyhawk/Constel lation incidents
]
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there were more than two-hundrecr programs aimed at eradicating racism,
improving Navy life for all personnel and upgrading performance. It is perti-
nent to again point out that most of these programs were formulated and in
various stages of implementation long before the adverse incidents of 12 October
1972 (Kittyhawk) and November 1972 (Constellation). It would appear that
the press made gross errors by inferring that top policy maker s had dragged
their feet in attempting to deal with the race-relations problem. Did Line
Commanders drag their feet? Were they incapacitated by negative racial feelings?
Were they incapacitated by lack of skills in this area of leadership or did
they suffer a "functional fixity" and tremble before the massiveness of the
problem? These questions and a myriad of others must await analysis by Naval
historians.
After the Kittyhawk and Constellation hit the news media in October,
it is a matter of record that all ranking Admirals in the Washington area,
charged with executing policy, were assembled by Admiral Zumwalt and "raked
over the coals." Zumwalt, in so many words, told them that programs did not
fail, men did. He told this group that equal meant just that--equal. At this
dressing down, the CNO said:
"... The time has come for me to speak ^jery plainly, to speak without the
usual cushions of jargon and without the exquisite politeness we sometimes
use to mask the impact of our thoughts... The Navy has made unacceptable
progress in the equal opportunity area, and the failure was not the pro -
grams but the fact that they were not being used . Some of the very things
I feared 28 months ago, did, in fact, take place (he had assembled minority
officers and wives at Washington months before)... The most destructive
influence on the resolution of racial problems is self-deception. It is
self deception to think that you can legislate attitudes, you cannot.
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It is self deception to feel a program is a reality, it is not. It is self
deception to think that the Navy is made up of some separate species of
man— that Navy personnel come to us fresh from some other place than our
world—that they come untainted by the prejudices of the society that
produced them, they do not. It is self deception to consider that all
issues involving Blacks and Whites are solely racial in motivation, they
are not. And, finally, it is self deception to consider the Navy or any
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other military organization as free wheel ing--to each his own way."
After this roasting the message was fired as a NAVOPS message to all subordinate
commands and released to the Press. The act of releasing the speech to the
press got Zumwalt into trouble with Congress. This reeked of public admonish-
ment of high level staff. Admiral Zumwalt, on learning of the bad press and
political ramifications caused by his remarks did some clarifying via the
immediate release of Z-Gram #117. The House Sub-Committee notes this on page
17669-17670 of its report of Kittyhawk/Constellation incidents.
This writer was in Mexico at the time the foregoing was in progress and
got his information from the New York Times and the English language daily
published for Americans there. I became alarmed when the speech became
political. It is a fact of history that no officer has ever survived causing
the Navy adverse publicity since the Somers mutiny of 1842- My alarm was
exacerbated by the fact that two Presidents had paid with their lives for
tampering with America's Black/White thing. Could a Chief of Naval Operations
do so and survive . This writer (as noted in the Appendix) witnessed, as a
Navy Steward, an invisible man in a white coat, the severe racist feelings
unleashed by the Roosevelt (1942) and Truman (1948) attempts to integrate the
Navy. He also knew what these feelings contributed to their failures.
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ZOC. (Underlining is that of the writer and is for sake of highlighting
pertinent sections of quote.)
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The mystery deepens when one asks ones self, "Why did Zumwalt proceed
in Phase I of the Navy's Human Goals program by choosing the "awareness process"
when safer , more polite tools were available?" The reason seems to rest in the
text of his speech to Washington area Flag Officers, especially the section on
self deception. It would appear that he did not back down. Rather, he ordered
all Navy men and officers to receive racial awareness training by the end of
fiscal year 1973 (June). This racial awareness effort was designed for 20
hours and was called UPWARD which means Understanding Personal Worth and Racial
Dignity. The feelings surfaced by UPWARD reached an intensity that often
precluded Navy men even addressing the other components of Phase I, such as
the (1) survey, and (2) command action plan formulation.
Misinformation and Misunderstanding Tending to Retard Learning by Human Resources
Graduate Students.
As an example, most of my students arrive at the Postgraduate School still
angry about the Phase I seminar. Those who did not attend are usually in posses-
sion of negative misinformation imparted by friends who did attend. Those who
did not attend UPWARDS usually arrive, due to misinformation, with ideas concern-
ing the Human Goals course that range from expectations of "touchy-feely" type
sensitivity training to intense "T-Group Methods."
As an Instructor, I have found that you can usually expect hostility to
surface early in the Human Goals class from some one who attended a "badly run
UPWARD" (there were many due to some bad facilitators). The hostility is
usually verbalized: "You're not going to change me!" or "I was more prejudiced
after I attended that damned UPWARD than I was before!" After encouraging,
aiding and abetting this ventilation I simply say, "I hope that you really
learn what happened to you by the time we complete the communications segment
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of study." Most students do just that. What has usually happened is that on
entering UPWARD students have done what most of us do—avoid psychic pain by
tucking negative perceptions of race into comfortable corners of their gentle-
manly skulls. The UPWARD Seminar was designed to surface the suppressed
sensory data. When this happens people are faced with the discomfort of facing
noxious stimuli which frustrates and angers them. As for a 20 hour or even a
60 hour seminarjfor the matter, changing an adult, the chances are remote
indeed.
In spite of the emotional upheaval generated by Phase I, according to
the Systems Development Corporation, the controversial seminar did what it was
designed to do--that is, "raise the awareness" of personnel in the area of
existing race problems. Researchers used a sample numbering of 112 commands
and control groups and collected data from 5,659 personnel who had not parti-
cipated in a seminar in April/May 1973. Researchers returned to 108 of the
original commands in September/October 1973 and re-interviewed 4,541 of its
original population. Of these 1,323 had participated in seminars between April
and Ocotber 1973; with the remaining 3,218 having not attended. Systems
Development Corporation drew its conclusions from data collected from personnel
who attended and those who did not. Those who did not attend a seminar were
utilized as a Control Group. These are some of the findings indicating that
the program was effective. (See page v and page 2-4.)
It is evident that the Race Relations Education Program was effective
in the increasing awareness of:
• personal worth and racial dignity,
• inequities in opportunity for minority personnel,
• differences between potential and actual effectiveness of individuals,
groups and programs in improving race relations in the command.
Furthermore the program promoted:
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• agreement among Blacks and Whites on important command racial issues,
• personal commitment toward the elimination of racism with all Navy
sectors,
• more positive attitudes toward the Navy (than non-program participants).
White senior enlisted and officer personnel were less affected than other
surveyed personnel. This probably accounts for the lag in development of
command action plans which should have followed.
This writer has found, after teaching and questioning students for one and
one-half years that most students become emotionally involved and lose sight
of Phase I's seminar goal. Consequently, many mentally assigned goals to
UPWARD which it was never designed to achieve.
Phase I - Commencement of the Human Resources Management Cycle: Caen evolution
whether an HRAV or Phase II requires its own HRM cycle (See Appendix A).
Methodology and Underlying Approach used by Human Resources Management Center
Personnel
.
1. The main tool of the HRMC specialist is sound organizational development
practice . The Commanding Officer (CO) is approached with the same courtesy
and respect as that afforded a top executive in any business corporation. He
and his staff are treated as clients. HRM specialists go to lengthy means to
get the CO and his staff to "buy into" the HRM program. Under no circumstances
are "I am the expert" or coercive approaches backed by law, even implied.
The eradication of suspicion and fear is absolutely necessary for any positive
HRM effort. Consequently, the prospective client (CO) and whoever he may
designate are visited from a month to six weeks in advance by the CO of the
training center, who holds the rank of Captain. This removes the obstacle
implied by "some kid telling me how to run my ship/squadron." As the top repre-
sentative of the HRMC he explains the program with great clarity to the client.
He further works at establishing a climate of confidentiality between the
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center and the client--a cornerstone of the total HRM effort and one of the
most meaningful breakthroughs in Naval history.
This concept formerly existed in American society between only certain
professionals and their clients. For example, between doctors, psychiatrists,
lawyers and their clients and between news reporters and their informants
(still hazy and a current focus of scholars in Jurisprudence). The concept is
totally new to military institutions and for this reason is often beyond the
realm of belief to most CO's. Yet the concept and its inclusion as part of
HRM programs is backed by an ALNAV instruction/message, which stipulates that
only the Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Personnel (ADCNO) possesses
authority to view or allow the viewing of data from a command. Any viewing or
assessment of these data by other than the CO/client and the HRMC people is
thoroughly discouraged by Washington. In short, an Admiral cannot view data
gathered aboard a subordinate's ship or in a squadron or station, on grounds it
would constitute a breach of confidentiality. This has caused some eyebrow
raising among retired Admirals, Captains and Type Commanders--a Junior has
authority to withhold information from a Senior? Stange but true.
2. The first entry into Phase I was focused on sensitizing and raising the
awareness of all Naval personnel in the race relations area of HRM. The
principle tool was the UPWARD (Understanding Personal Worth and Racial Dignity)
seminar. The second component was focused upon problem identification data
gathering via surveys and interviews. This is movement from Phase I to the
prelude of HRAV. The third component consists of (1) taking the data ashore
for computerization, and (2) returning to the command with printouts and
interpreting the data findings for the Captain and designated staff.
If a CO questions the data findings it is his prerogative to ask for
more validation. This is usually done by carrying out "spot interviews" with
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personnel in the problem area concerned. On being satisfied the CO, utilizing
the data findings, assigns a staff group to develop the Command Action plan
(CAP). He may call upon HRMC people to assist in this at any time or he may
elect to wait until his HRAV standown (five days) to seek upgrading or modifi-
cation of the CAP. A viable CAP should contain, as a minimum:
a. A full statement of each problem or issue addressed,
b. The objectives addressed for each problem/issue area,
c. Course of action and in the better CAP's a time schedule for
accomplishing objectives.
d. Note on potential or anticipated trouble spots in each course of
action and tentative methods for dealing with them,
e. Target dates for completion of objectives and assessment of movement
toward the CAP goal
.
3. Whether the CAP is developed as a closing component of Phase I or is done
during the HRAV the same method is used (workshops) to assist the command.
Persons involved in CAP workshops should include:
a. The CO, XO and Department heads - top management,
b. Division officers - middle management,
c. CPO/heading PO level - line management,
d. Lower PO ratings and/or seamen - line workers. The representatives of
this latter group must be carefully picked for personality, knowledge
and according to whether they enjoy the respect of the crew.
Unit action . The ongoing implementation and monitoring of actions set forth
in the CAP and follow-on activities requested by the commanding officer make up
steps 6 and 7 of the HRM cycle.
As the time sequence in the cycle moves toward Phase II a stopgap type
reassessment component (the HRAV) is inserted in order to facilitate proper
linkage between Phase I and Phase II. Thus the client group is brought to a
degree of readiness prior to Phase II entry.
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4. Scope of survey/interview data coverage: a key to pre HRAV readiness
and assessment as to where a command is in psychic progression.
a. Supervisory leadership (support, team building, goal emphasis, work
facilitation),





d. Additional (work coordination, satisfaction, integration of men and
mission, results, training),
e. Human Goals program areas (overseas diplomacy, EO/RR, drugs, alcohol,
career counseling).
In the survey for forward deployed units and overseas shore activities the HRM
cycle will include an addendumof ten questions and an overseas issues identifi-
cation meeting. Thus little time is lost on "rehash-type" argumentation.
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PRELUDE TO PHASE II OF THE NAVY HUMAN GOALS EFFORT:
ITS PROGRAMS AND PROCESSES
What the Navy has essentially done in Phase I is said to all hands,
"We've made you 'aware, 1 now carry out the program." The program does not
limit itself to race relations alone. Instead the program's goal is aimed
at (1) improving the quality of life for aJJ Navy personnel and their families.
As a further example, the Navy has recently granted women the status of
minorities to insure that sexism will not retard their careers nor restrict
them to the "low prestige" duties that they traditionally performed in the
past. (2) Extending the leadership reach of its leaders by educating them to
deal with this generation of young people with their different life-styles
and needs. The realization is that they are our personnel pool. It is our duty
to utilize them in the best possible manner. These are the factors that carry
weight at the Defense Department.
Basically the Human Goals program has been codified and all of its
program fragments have been focused in five broad areas:
(1) Human resource management,
(2) Equal opportunity and race relations,
(3) Drug abuse education control and alcoholism countermeasures,
(4) Intercultural relations,
(5) Organizational development - Principle method of program implementation
and maintenance is woven as a methodology throughout the education and
training effort.
The overall Human Goals program objectives are:
(1) To ensure the development of the full personal and professional potential
of all Navy men and women, regardless of race, creed, color or national
origin;
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(2) To ensure the application of that potential toward maximum effectiveness
in the performance of the Navy's primary mission;
(3) To improve the Navy as a professional organization which recognizes
the worth and dignity of all its personnel and thus ensure increased
capacity to attract and retain high caliber personnel;
(4) To impart enough hard knowledge of intercultural relations to enhance
potential for accomplishment of the Navy's fourth mission beyond the
seas (extend and assist American diplomacy).
The Human Resources Management Availability (HRAV)
The reader should remember that the components of Phase I, which starts
the Human Goals Resource Management cycle of Human Goals, consists of three com-
ponents: (1) the UPWARD seminar, (2) the information survey and based upon survey
feedback data, and (3) the creation of a Command Action Plan (CAP) for dealing
with identifiable problems in the command. The Human Resources Management Availa-
bility (HRAV) is a five day stand-down . From talking with my students at the
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), I find that most feel that it facilitates taking
better advantage of Phase II if the HRAV precedes Phase II of HRM program. This,
however, is not a program requirement. The relevant factor of HRAV is that it
assists Navy programs in meeting the exacting criteria of OD -- an ongoing inter-
active process. This five day series of seminars and workshops is probably the
best current indicateor that the Navy means business and intends that this effort
go beyond the "get your card punched" perception to actual institutionalization
of HRM programs. If the HRAV is measured in time and money, the cost is mind-
boggling. As examples:
(1) In order for Type-Commanders to afford each ship five days for an
intense effort in HRM this "software" program had to be made a part of
the agenda for operations and planning conferences held by Fleet
Commanders.
(2) That the Navy has less than 500 ships to carry out a global commitment
imposes a rigorous operating schedule on most units. The taking of
five workdays for HRM in itself, drives home to unit commanders and
their power brokers the importance of HRM programs as perceived by
Washington. Action here probably exceeds words if we weigh impact
quality.
(3) The Navy's aim is to eventually have all commands rotate through the HRAV
evolution every 18 months.
A Junction of HRAV:
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1. If a ship or command has experienced trouble in pulling from survey data
a priortized list of problems to address or does not know how to develop
a command action plan (CAP) Human Resources Management specialist (HRMS)
attached to the Human Resources Management Center (HRMC) or Human
Resources Management Detachment (HRMD) will assist in teaching command
people.
2. If the command's CAP proves weak and ineffective, HRM center specialist
will assist command in upgrading same. Often a reevaluation and interpre-
tation of data is indicated, or clarification and smoothing of format
and language could be the problem. Whatever the problem, assistance is
available at HRMC during the standown. Often the need may indicate lack
of communications skills or bad lateral/vertical communication.
3. Any area germane to the CAP among those covered in the initial survey may
be reassessed. As an example the survey data covers (a) supervisory leader-
ship, (b) peer leadership, (c) command climate, (d) work group coordination,
(e) human goals areas such as equal opportunity and race relations (EO/RR)
drugs, alcohol, and career counseling and communication effectiveness.
It should perhaps, for the sake of clarification, be pointed out that the time
interval between Phase I and the HRAV is from 6 to 12 months.
The Prelude to an HRAV - Stage Setting .
For a broad view of the Naval Human Resources Management cycle process
see Appendix C. If careful scrutiny is given the schema, it is possible to
see how the methodology of applied organizational development is utilized
throughout. The schema shows Phase I from the initial contact with the command
(client) to the formulation of the command action plan (CAP) later negotiation
and planning for the HRAV (see 5a). At the actual HRAV five day standdown (see
step 6) the following is done:
4
For full understanding of abbreviations in HG program see Part I
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1. Development or modification olvthe command action plan - emergent from
survey data and/or interviews.
2. Based upon feedback from the command, discuss actual problems and secure
agreement on the needs of the unit (needs may include upgrading communica-
tion, training in group problem solving techniques, document formulation,
etc.
3. Secure agreement with client-command upon the HRAV program design (all
are unique) and processes involved in addressing the identifiable problem
areas.
4. The workshop method is utilized to upgrade, train and educate command
people toward "command self-sufficiency"--an end goal of the Human
Resources Management effort. No longer do outside experts "lay their trip"
on a command and leave them with the problems. HRMS trans a Command Train-
ing Team (CTT) which assists the CO and members of the ship's company.
Note that training/education progression is movement from (1) awareness toward
race relations/equal opportunity, (2) other command problems and their identi-
fication (data gathering and interpretation), and (3) tentative plan for
addressing these problems.
The Commander, U. S. Pacific Fleet, in the fall of 1973 asked the CO
of HRMC, San Diego to carry out an experiment aimed at saving valuable time.
The experiment consisted of testing the feasibility of carrying out both the
HRAV and Phase II evolutions in one five day period. It developed, according
to recent HRMC visitors to the Naval Postgraduate School, that this could be
done with small ships complements (Destroyers, Frigates, LST, etc.). But tended
to overwhelm HRMC resources where large commands (Aircraft carriers, Cruisers,
Stations, etc.) are concerned. Where one team could handle a small command,
a large carrier, for example, could involve three or four HRMC teams in order
to carry out one evaluation. Further many Captains preferred to undergo the
HRAV and Phase II separately. Consequently they were given that option which
in turn gave them a certain flexibility in scheduling HRM evaluation and which
further characterizes the agency/client approach.
Naval Instructional Technology Development Center, San Diego, Content Reduction
of Human Goals Program (March 1975).
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PHASE II EQUAL OPPORTUNITY/RACE RELATIONS (EO/RR)
This phase of the Human Resources Management cycle builds upon the
raised awareness in Phase I and the training, modifications and impetus
generated by the HRAV linkage between Phase I and Phase II, where the Phase I
data was utilized to develop the Command Action Plan (CAP). Data from the
Phase II cycle process is used to develop the Affirmative Action Plan (AAP),
The basic difference in the two documents is that the:
1. CAP is unlimited in its scope. The CAP may address any problem in the
Human Resources Management spectrum ranging from general ships climate
through bad communications, malfunctioning justice systems to education,
training or race relations.
2. The AAP is limited as it is problem specific to economic opportunity/
race relations.
The CAP derives its actual legal underpinnings from the Defense Department's
credo as actualized by the U. S. Navy. The AAP derives its legal foundations
from laws established by an act of Congress, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
1968. These acts cover not just the military institutions, but all civilian
institutions as well. As examples, law enforcement, industry, public education,
etc. The Navy's functional program cycle is concerned with:
The current EO/RR program builds on the awareness generated by race
relations seminars (UPWARDS/Executive) that were the nucleus of Phase I.
The goal of Phase II is the achievement of equal opportunity and treatment
of all personnel through the establishment of command environments that
encourage organizational and individual actions to address practices
that contribute to racism.
Here it is inferred that racism tends to demean both whites and minorities,
the Navy is in process of retraining Race Relations Facilitators and Education
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Specialists (RRF/RRES) for the broader designated specialization as Equal
Opportunity Program Specialist (EOPS). These new specialists receive heavy
training in consultant and organizational development skills. The difference
in the Human Resources Management Specialist and the Equal Opportunity Program
Specialist is centered in where each is assigned in the HRM program structure,
both possess some of the same capabilities (more officers are HRM's). While
the HRMS is assigned to an HRM Center or an HRM Detachment which serves Type
Commands the EOPS is assigned to the staff of the Type Commander where he
acts as consultant to the staff and the ships under that staff. He is the
operational commands creature.
As the core of the HRM program is the CAP, the actual key to the achieve-
ment of equal opportunity is the AAP. Both are derived from the HRM cyclical
process. Both plans are capable of being monitored and updated at any point
in time.
The main features of the EO/RR cycle component of the program are much
like those processes in Phase I except that this program's structural aspects
contain greater specificity. As an example the AAP must be designed to trigger
and sustain actions that will:
(1) ensure equal opportunity for all personnel,
(2) counter the negative forces of racism in a manner that aims at its
eradication, and
(3) promote understanding and acceptance of cultural differences and
preferences.
It is a requirement that all Commanding Officers develop, implement and promul-
gate a viable, affirmative action plan (AAP). To insure its relevance the
plan is to be updated periodically in accordance with unit needs. The only
limitation on plan function rests in its appropriateness to a command's mission,
its size and the impingements of local conditions.
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Throughout this cycle HRMS and EOPS act as consultants and assist with
the development and implementation of the AAP. The process consists of:
(1) The gathering and interpreting of data relevant to EO/RR and the
development of Equal Opportunity Quality Indicators (EOQI's).
(2) Conducting of a series of five workshops (see steps 5 and 7 of cycle
in Appendix C).
(3) Carry out follow-up assistance (see step 9) as needed for program
maintai nance.
THE PHASE II EDUCATION/TRAINING PROCESS
1. Initial contact and negotiation with the Commanding Officer (CO) and
whoever else the CO may designate.
2. Schedule a data collection visit in order to generate data needed to
to develop EOQI's, the key to monitoring the EO/RR aspects of Phase II.
Perhaps it is relevant that we understand, at this point, what an EOQI is.
The EOQI's are instruments that enable a commanding officer to check those
aspects of his command pertinent to EO/RR for quality and to ascertain whether
equal opportunity exists. It is a truism that "all men are created equal but
some are treated more equal than others." Whether all personnel are treated
equally is too often found on paper rather than existing in fact. The Navy
has wisely devised a way to check the quality of that ambiguous quantity that
we refer to as equality. EOQI does so by graphic presentation . These instru-
ments (EOQI's) remove the built-in blinders from those at the top of the
specialized bureaucratic structure charged with operational commands. As an
example, skilled EOPS/HRMS personnel can check:
(a) A command's retention rate (how many men reinlisted);
(b) Upward mobility (example: (1) how many men were eligible for "A"
school? (2) Broken down by race, how many actually attended?) of the
various racial, ethnic or religious groups;
(c) The administration of military justice over a semi-annual or annual
period and pull from this data a good assessment of the presence or
absence of EO.
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These aspects of command tell a lot about its overall climate. That this is
so angers or frightens only those commanding officers and staffs who are too
uninformed to really conceptualize the great potential utility of this program
segment. For if EOQI's are used within the current "spirit of the HRM programs"
they may ...assist the commanding officer to identify areas that may warrant
greater exploration and action. Action that could prevent a Kittyhawk/Constel-
lation incident.
To further understand this tool and its potential let's look at how it
can be utilized as a source of "real information" for the busy CO/Staff, thus
enabling him to engage in pro-active action, capable of preventing racial
incidents. It is pertinent here probably to point out that real information is
primary to pro-active command behavior and riot prevention. "Rumor," on the
other hand, minus pro-active behavior takes over command and places the commander
in the vulnerable position of reactive behavior--the stuff of which race riots
are made as it precludes preventive action. For sake of clarity, as to positive
usage of EOQI's, let's look at one EOQI area. Suppose that after sifting six
months of a commanding officer's administration of military justice at a given
level that EOPS/HRMS consultants found that of 100 white seamen committing a
given infraction, 75% were given non-judicial punishment and/or reprimands. Of
100 Blacks committing similar offenses, 25% were given non-judicial punishment
and reprimands and 75% were either court martialed or discharged, administra-
tively. This could alert a CO to really start looking carefully at the racial
attitudes of his subordinates and introspectively at himself— possibly into the
perceptions of his minority crew members. As an example "do they perceive
themselves as victimized by racist immediate supervisors?" "Do they feel that




Sometimes it may be found that a CO has really treated, judicially,
all hands fairly, yet one or both factions (could be young whites or Blacks,
or both groups) really feel that one or the other is "favored" by the CO.
There may not exist any evidence to support these perceptions, yet these
misconceptions have created deep seated feelings of persecution damaging to
the image of the CO and the command climate. The EOQI findings in such an
instance offers a CO two options:
Option 1. He could say, "Those sore heads are just hunting something to
"bitch" about and ignore the negative feelings, or
Option 2. The CO may choose, via pro-active behavior, to counter these
feelings by the wide dissemination of the findings and their meanings, thus
sharing "real information" with his crew.
Option 1 would be reactive and would do nothing toward solving the
problem while allowing misconceptions to cause deterioration of morale and
kindle animosities and generate actions conducive to negative racial incidents.
Whether these feelings have any basis in reality is irre!evant--they are there .
They exist . They may or may not escalate and therein lies the potential danger.
Option 2 on the other hand allows a CO to reiterate the rights of his
young people but to also place the onus of responsibility on them for their
behavior. In this way crew members enmeshed in misconception are forced by
factual data to do the requisite introspective thinking necessary to deal with
the real world situation in which they find themselves.
If EOQI ' s reveal a trend that could be interpreted as racist or grossly
insensitive where minority crew members are concerned, it may prove inappropriate
to the solution of the problem to disseminate its findings as it could alert
those who have in some manner remained untouched and escalate those feelings
of minorities affected. Therefore, the better part of valor would be for the
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CO to move at once toward rectifying the trend and informing key staff of his
desires: that they look carefully at all report slips prior to instituting
proceedings. The EOQI is the key to monitoring, qualitatively, the negative
or positive functions of the AAP.
Where surveys and interviews were utilized for problem identification
in developing the CAP, the AAP approach utilizes (1) workshops to educate/train
a command's power brokers, and (2) research needed to develop EOQI's, serving as
an AAP monitoring tool for the CO and his staff.
EOQI's serve another purpose. They assist the CO in identification of
those areas that may need greater, in depth, exploration and action.
It is pertinent at this juncture to point out that future command self
sufficiency has been set in motion as a prelude to Phase II. For example:
1. The EOPS will have gone aboard ship or to the Air Squadron or Seabee unit,
etc., and trained a Command Training Team (CTT) composed of client/unit
personnel appointed by the CO and his staff.
2. During the Phase II workshop series these CTT trainees will actualize their
training under the watchful eyes of EOPS trainers. All CTT members qualify
as trainers by actually conducting workshops and undergoing post workshop
critiques with EOPS and HRMC personnel, during Phase II.
3. Since only the key command power brokers are able to attend the HRAV and/or
Phase II, responsibility falls to the CTT to put the rest of the crew through
the workshops and acquainting them with a composite picture of the Human
Resources Management program.
4. The CTT is a resource, in being, who assist the CO and his Human Relations
Council with problems in the EO/RR area on an ongoing basis.
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If the CTT is backed by the CO and is positively projected as an organ
representing the CO in the welfare of all hands, along with his Human Relations
Council, it can relieve the CO of much of the petty, burdensome details such
as hot lines, etc., by dealing positively with many petty grievances at the
division level. Under no circumstances should the CTT allow itself to be pro-
jected as merely mi ti gators between Blacks and Whites. Rather, its ideal image
should be that of an assistance arm of the CO, interested in the welfare of aJJ
hands. Since it is a "compensatory tool" it would be easy for other crew members
to, by induced perceptions and mental sets imparted by recent history, make the
CTT a "Black/White thing." This would be tragic as whites would assume that
the CTT is not meant to serve them. If projected as an all -hands organ a CTT
can help in strengthening the chain of command. It should not be limited to
merely conducting workshops. The team could well be an extension of the Human
Relations Council and thus, positive command influence. It should be evident
to the reader at this point that the Navy HRM program:
1. Has increased its sophistication during its short history,
2. Does not depend on fragile, naive, altruistic or do-goodism type approaches,
3. Does not coerce illy prepared people into emotion laden (EO/RR) areas
minus proper preparation,
4. Does move participants by definite evolutionary process (organizational
development) toward a high degree of readiness for the next stage or phase
during the latent period between phases.
The equal opportunity/counter racism workshop and other workshops are attempted
only after much preparation, as indicated in the preceding explanation. Work-
shops for Phase II are conducted after the EOPS analyzes and organizes the
EOQI's and data made available by the HRM survey. It cannot be reiterated
enough that the "expertism" approach applied by over-zealous race-relations
facilitators in Phase I and which angered as many people as it helped, has been
eliminated by the HRM Program Directors.
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WORKSHOPS UTILIZED AS PHASE II:
EDUCATION AND TRAINING MEDIA-
1
.
The Human Resources Management Cycle and Equal Opportunity Workshop .
This workshop introduces participants to the HRM cycle, as a process, its
legal underpinnings: (a) The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 1968, and (b)
The Navy's Equal Opportunity Manual - OPNAV Instruction 5354.1 (May 29,
1974), discusses other workshops and their functions, and, specifically,
how these are applied in Phase II. The goal and objectives of this phase
are clearly stated along with their rationales during this introduction-
type workshop.
The CO determines who attends this workshop. Usually the CO, XO,
department heads, middle-management, line-management and selected line-
worker representatives. However, the CO is given wide latitude where this
workshop is concerned. He may:
(a) Elect to accept or reject this workshop based on his personal
perceptions of command need, or
(b) Include or exclude any level of command representation which
he chooses to.
It is participants in this workshop who are usually charged with the
development, refinement, upgrading and implementation of the AAP.
2. The Affirmative Action Planning Workshop . The purposes of this workshop
are to:
(a) Impart to the participants the actual skills needed to develop
or upgrade an AAP.
(b) Develop an AAP appropriate to command needs.
3. Actions to Counter Racism Workshop (ACR) . This workshop is a required
evolution for all Division Officers, Warrant Officers, Division Chiefs and
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Leading Petty Officers (middle management and line supervisors). The
objectives of this workshop are to:
(a) Impart to personnel a clear understanding of equal opportunity
as defined by the Navy.
(b) Teach, discuss and drill participants on actions necessary to
counter racism.
(c) Assist participants in the development of conduct needed, via
role-model ing , to support, maintain and promulgate a viable
affirmative action plan.
4. The Military Rights and Responsibilities Workshop . This workshop is
required of all personnel in pay grades E-l to E-4 . The objective purpose
of this workshop is to:
(a) Ensure that problems are resolved at the lowest appropriate
command level
.
(b) Emphasize and clarify the Chain of Commands responsibility towards
each individual - see that young people know their rights under
Naval law, as a two-edged, sword-type service tool.
(c) Ensure that sailors know their responsibility to the Navy, its
missions, their country, themselves and the Chain of Command.
This workshop is not conducted by EOPS or HRMS's. It is conducted by
Command Training Team (CTT) members appointed by the CO and, as previously
indicated, under the EOPS and/or HRMS's supervision during Phase II. The
end goal of this workshop is to really get young people to realize what
their swearing in ceremony meant and to understand that rights can only be
realized if backed by responsibility.
5. The Cultural Expression Workshop . The central theme throughout this
workshop is that the Navy draws a portion of its strength from the cultural
diversity of its men and home. Here the participant is reminded that we
7Phase II - Equal Opportunity/Race Relations - Consultant Guide , Vol. I,
NAVPERS 1525.9 (see Cultural Expression in the Navy Workshops).
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are a pluralistic society composed of peoples from nearly all parts of the
globe. Most races, colors, creeds, religions and ethnic groups may be
found in this country. The Navy in developing this workshop took into
consideration that unless an American serviceman learns to ap-
preciate the positive aspects of cultural pluralism in his own country,
it is doubtful if he can appreciate the varied cultures of host nations
beyond the seas. A bigot importing his bigotry to other countries cannot
assist the Navy in its fourth mission - act as an extension of the diplomatic
arm of the United States. Nor does this workshop limit itself to the ap -
preciation of foreign cultures . The subcultures in this country are dealt
with. The sophistication of this workshop is further enhanced by its
movement from the vertical aspects of stereotyped stratification based upon
race, ethnics, etc., to the lateral aspects which deal with what I call sub-
subcultures. Let's take an example of this on a typical American ship.
The term Boatswain's Mate elicits certain negative stereotyped perceptions
from other highly technical ratings. The stereotype goes like this: A
Boatswain's Mate is a guy who wears a No. 6 hat and number 13 shoes -
indicating that he is a stupid oaf. In the Cultural Expression Workshop
personnel are reminded that there is no way, except long apprenticeships,
to develop a seasoned Boatswain's Mate. If the Boatswains did not do their
work, any steel ship would be a derelict within three months..
Further, it is the Boatswain and his gang who carry out rigging for
refueling at sea, stores transfer, etc., without which sustained operations
would be impossible. "He's not so dumb," is what comes across. Another
very unique feature of the Cultural Expression Workshop is that it allows
for the emotion-laden racial feeling surfaced in the Phase I UPWARD Seminar
to be massaged in a controlled environment, and worked through. As an
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example, all parties to the discussion agree to "be down front" - "tell it
like it is" - say how they really feel. Consequently, the impact of "little
things" that often escape busy staff people are surfaced. I am quite sure
that few Admirals and Generals, Captains and Colonels "have in their gut"
the deep-seated animosities and potential for violence of feelings generated
around, (1) food, (2) hair, (3) dress and (4) symbolics such as the "dapping"
(the elaborate handshake Blacks use). Examples:
(a) Music : In a bar, Whites want hillbilly, Blacks want jazz and
Mexican-Americans want Latino.
(b) Food : At the Base Mess only typical American fare is served
to the chagrin of minorities - Blacks want "soul -food", Orientals
want rice, Mexicans want tamales, etc.
(c) Clothing : Whites emulate John Wayne with boots and cowboy hats,
Philippines wear barongs (elaborate national shirt), Blacks wear
Dashekis, beads and amulets (bright African).
(d) Hair : Nothing in modern times possibly has generated more hostility
than the "Afro-hair" style in vogue among Blacks and the "long-
hair" affected by certain groups of young Whites. All of these
symbols of the youth revolt are allowed free-rein discussion here.
Further, sailors are told that the Navy draws strength and talent
from its diversity and that each person has the right to practice his or
her culture - so long as it does not interfere with the Navy's mission . As
an example, when Dr. Downs, an Anthropologist attached to HRMC San Diego,
informed the group that it would be some years before they could wear their
"righteous threads" (mod-type or ethnic clothing) in the Indian Ocean area,
a howl went up. Dr. Downs explained that in visiting the African, East
Indian, and Arabic state consulates he found that nothing made Americans
look worse to host-nationals of this area than our mode of dress.
Consequently, we would have to, for some years, embrace the "international
tenets of good grooming". He also explained that the Japanese, for
instance, had observed Americans, at close quarters for 30 years, and the
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Philippinos have known us much longer. Thus, we could take liberties in
our dress in those areas.
A young Black in the group who had said little up to the time
exploded with, "Man, you mean to tell me that I can't go ashore at Mombasa
(Kenya) in my Dasheki when I meet my African brothers? I'm gonna be mad
as hell!" Some young hip-type Whites joined in support of this youngster.
Dr. Downs, again, patiently explained that even Africans only know us
through Hollywood movies. He then posed the question, "If you were a Kenyan
policeman and saw John Wayne, Superfly, Easy Rider and Shaft-type people
coming over the bow of a visiting American ship, what would you do - taking
into consideration the violence depicted in those movies?" This failed to
disperse the young Black's feelings of outrage. At this point, this writer
interjected, "Look brother, let me ask you a question. What is the Navy's
fourth mission?" The reply: "Assist the diplomatic effort overseas." Then
said, "Yesterday you attended the Military Rights and Responsibilities
Workshop and was reminded that you swore to assist in any and all Navy
missions. Now, if the success or failure of the mission hinged upon your
not wearing the Dasheki, what would be your responsibility?" Finally, a
positive reply, "If it was run down thata way for me, I guess I'd hafta
buy into it." Note that this youngster had picked up a bit of the jargon
(buy-in) of organizational development.
In parting, it becomes evident that the Navy has moved from inaction
to reaction into pro-active behavior . Further, the Equal Opportunities
Manual , OPNAV Instruction 5354.1 (May 29, 1974) informs all power brokers
in no uncertain terms that:
Insensitivity, racism and sexism cannot coexist with a
productive equal opportunities program. Therefore,
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Commanders must identify through personal contact, performance
counseling, dialogue or other communicative means at their
disposal, those persons, regardless of race, cultural or
ethnic backgrounds or sex, whose actions are inimical to
cooperation and understanding among members of all races,
cultural or ethnic backgrounds and between the sexes.
This document further states with great clarity what disposition is to be
made of officers, enlisted and civilian personnel who do not exhibit ability
to buy into the Human Goals Program. Roughly, the process resembles what
all baseball umpires allow a batter - 3 strikes. For the first offense
,
one is counseled; second offense , one is disciplined; and the third offense
,
Commanders are directed to process that person for discharge.
Probably, the reason that I , as a Black-Man and Cynic, can finally
believe in this program effort rests on the program structural area dealing
with accountability . The Navy has learned that you cannot drive a program
aimed at social change from Washington, D.C., as it could be retarded, like
Roosevelt's and Truman's efforts, by gentlemen's agreements among subordinates.
Hence, accountability rests on Fleet Commanders in Chief and e\/ery subordinate
and unit Commanding officer. It is this that may cause the Navy to succeed
in institutionalizing its HG Program.
United States Navy, Equal Opportunity Manual , OPNAV Instruction 5354.1,
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Instructions for graphing the att ached Indicator
a. The name of the majority and largest minority, second largest
minority, etc. will normally be in the first block (left side) of
the graph to show the racial/ethnic profile of the command. All
racial and ethnic minorities, i.e., Black, Filipino, Mexican American,
Native American, Puerto Rican, Oriental American, on board must be
accounted for. Additional graphs may be used to plot women profiles
or other breakdowns such as non-high school graduates, etc. (For
this Navy-wide sample all the races presently coded in the Central
Computer were used.)
b. In each section of the graph, a series of lines (or bars for
this sample) will portray percentages of the racial and ethnic groups
within a command using the total number in a particular group as the
base. (For example, in this sample, the EOQI indicates that of all
enlisted Caucasians in the Navy, 28% of them are undesignated strikers,
17% are designated strikers, 20% are E-4, etc.; whereas for all black
enlisted men in the Navy, 49% are undesignated strikers, 12% are
designated strikers, 9% are E-4, etc.)
c. The scales of the graphs may be the same or differ, if necessary,
to better illustrate sparse numbers. The same scale must be used,
however, for all groups within a section of the graph. It will be
assumed that the scale to the left of the graph is used for the
entire group; however, if the right hand scale is used for any section,
an arrow pointing to the right will be used in that section to indicate
the proper scale to be used. (In this sample case the scale to the
right is used for and only for the E-8 & E-9 section.)
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GLOSSARY FROM CONTENT REDUCTION
OF NAVY HUMAN GOALS PROGRAM
AAP Affirmative Action Plan
ADCNO Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
AP Alcoholism Prevention




ARU ' Alcohol Rehabilitation Units
ATU Alcoholism Training Unit
CAAC '
s
Counseling and Assistance Centers
CAP Command Action Plan
CINC Commander in Chief
CINCLANT Commander in Chief Atlantic
CINCPAC Commander in Chief Pacific
CNET Chief of Naval Education and Training
CODAC '
s
Collateral Duty Alcoholism Counselors
DAC Drug Abuse Control
DAES Drug Abuse Education Specialist
DAPA Drug Abuse Program Advisors
EOPS Equal Opportunity Program Specialist
EOQI Equal Opportunity Quality Indicators
EO/RR Equal Opportunity/Race Relations
HRAV Human Resource Management Availability
HRM Human Resource Management
HRMC/D Human Resource Management Centers and Detachments
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HRMS Human Resource Management Specialists
HRMST Human Resource Management Support Teams
ISIC Immediate Superiors in Command
LMT Leadership and Management Training
NDACS Navy Drug Abuse Counselor Schools
NDRC's Navy Drug Rehabilitation Centers
OD Overseas Diplomacy
Organizational Development
ODC Overseas Diplomacy Coordinators
OPNAVINST
RAF Racial Awareness Facilitator
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REPORT BY THE SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISCI-
PLINARY PROBLEMS IN THE U.S. NAVY
I. Introduction
During the course of the 92d Congress, there has heen increasing
concern in the House Armed Services Committee over the developing
of more relaxed discipline in the military services. Substantial evidence
of this practice reached us directly through subcommittee investiga-
tive reports and messages from concerned service members, as well as
indirectly through events reported in the news media.
While generally our men have performed in an outstanding fashion
during battle and other in extremis circumstances, on occasion there
has been an erosion of good order and discipline under more normal
operations. More disturbing have been the reports of sabotage of naval
property, assaults, and other serious lapses in discipline afloat. Further,
lawful orders have been subject to 'committee" or "town meeting'''
proceedings prior to compliance by subordinates.
Capping the various reports were the recent serious incidents aboard
U.S.S. Kitty Ha irk and U.S.S. Constellation—aircraft carriers of
vital importance to the naval mission in Southeast Asia.
Immediately following air operations aboard the Kitty Hawk on
the evening of October 12. 1072, a series of incidents broke out wherein
groups of blacks, armed with chains, wrenches, bars, broomsticks and
other dangerous weapons, went marauding through sections of the ship
disobeying orders to cease, terrorizing the crew, and seeking out white
personnel for senseless beating with lists and with weapons which re-
sulted in extremely serious injury to three men and the medical treat-
ment of many more, including some blacks. While engaged in this
conduct some were heard to shout. "Kill the son-of-a-bitch; kill the
white trash; wipe him out!" Others shouted, "They are killing our
brothers.''
Aboard the U.S.S. Constellation, during the period of November 3-4.
1072. what has been charitably described as "unrest'" and as a "sit-in"
took place while the ship was underway for training exercises. The
vast majority of the dissident sailors were black and were allegedly
protesting several grievances they claimed were in need of correction.
These sailors were off-loaded as a part of a "beach detachment", given
liberty, refused to return to the ship, and were later processed only
for this minor disciplinary infraction (f> hours of unauthorized ab-
sence) at Naval Air Station. North Island, near San Diego.
Because of the inherent seriousness of these incidents, the Honorable
F. Edward Hebert. chairman. House Armed Services Committee, con-
sidered it necessary to appoint this special subcommittee on Novem-
ber 13, 1072, to inquire at once into disciplinary problems in the U.S.




problems which occurred recently on the aircraft carriers U.S.S. Kitty
f/aick and U.S.S. Constellation."
During the course of its inquiry and hearings, which commenced on
November 20, 197*2, the subcommittee completed some 2.565 pages of re-
porter's transcript of testimony, and assembled a large volume of
reports, directives, military investigations and other papers which
have been the basis for this report.
II. Findings , Opinions, and Recommendations
a. findings
1. The subcommittee finds that permissiveness, as defined on
page l7f>70 of this report, exists m the Navy today. Although we have
been able to investigate only certain specific incidents in depth, the
total information made available to us indicates the condition could
be servicewide.
2. The vast majority of Navy men and women are performing their
assigned duties loyally and efficiently. The subcommittee is fully
aware and appreciative of their efforts. The cause for concern, how-
ever, rests with that segment of the naval force which is either unable
or unwilling to function within the prescribed limitations and up to
the established standards of performance or conduct.
3. The subcommittee has been unable to determine any precipitous
cause for the rampage aboard U.S.S. Kitty Hatch. Not only wTas there
not one case wherein racial discrimination could be pinpointed, but
there is no evidence which indicated that the blacks who participated
in that incident perceived racial discrimination, either in general or
in any specific, of such a nature as to justify belief that violent reaction
was required.
4. The subcommittee finds that the incident aboard U.S.S. Constel-
lation was the result of a carefully orchestrated demonstration of
passive resistance wherein a small number of blacks, certainly no
more than 20-25, in a well-organized campaign, willfully created
among other blacks the belief that white racism existed in the Navy
and aboard that ship. The subcommittee, again in this instance as
with the incident aboard Kitty Hairk, found no specific example of
racial discrimination. In this case, however, it is obvious that the par-
ticipants perceived that racial discrimination existed. Several events
were made to appear as examples of racial discrimination when, in
fact, such was not the case.
5. Testimony revealed that one of the triggering devices for the dis-
sident 'activity aboard Constellation was a misunderstanding, particu-
larly among the young blacks, which led them to believe that in order
to reduce the number of personnel aboard the ship to the authorized
level, general discharges were about to be awarded to 250 black crew
members.
In fact, the ship was in the process of reducing its complement by
250 personnel in order to make room for the air wing personnel who
would embark prior to the forthcoming combat deployment. At the
same time the captain had directed that certain records be reviewed
and that those he considered to be troublemakers, if they qualified for
administrative discharge, be notified of the ship's intent to commence
processing of the required paperwork.
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It is unfortunate that this latter discharge procedure was initiated
against six crewmembers in one day without adequate explanation
of the justification for such action—especially since all six were black
and this promoted the feeling that racial discrimination was the
cause. In addition, the lack of counselling pertaining to the poor per-
formance marks received by those being considered for administra-
tive discharge caused notification of pending discharge to serve as
traumatic incidents to those who were to receive them.
There is strong evidence, however, that these misunderstandings
were fostered and fanned by a small group of skilled agitators within
the ranks of the young black seamen.
6. The subcommittee was informed that a review, conducted by
Naval Personnel Research Activity, San Diego, has found no racia l
discrimination in the punishments awarded by the Commanding Offi-
cer, F.S.S. Constellation .
The subcommittee found no evidence that that conclusion was in
error.
7. Discipline, requiring immediate response to command, is abso-
lutely essential to any military force. Particularly in the forces afloat
there is no room for the "town meeting" concept or the employment of
negotiation or appeasement to obtain obedience to orders. The Navy
must be controlled by command, not demand.
8. The subcommittee found that insufficient emphasis has been given
to formal leadership training, particularly in the ranks of petty officers
and junior officers .
9. The generally smart appearance of naval personnel, both afloat
and ashore, has deteriorated markedly. While the subcommittee ap-
preciates efforts to allow maximum reasonableness in daily routines,
there is absolutely no excuse for slovenly appearance of officers and
men in the Navy uniform and such appearance should not be tolerated.
10. There was no formal training of the master-at-arms force. There
was not effective utilization of the Marine force. Certainly there was
no contingency plan for the coordination of these two forces in events
such as these. Once the activities started, there was no plan which
would have acted to halt them. The result was to let them wear them-
selves out.
11^ rhe members of the subcommittee did not find and are unaware
of any instances of institutional discrimination on the part of the
Navy toward any group of persons, majority or minority.
12 Black unity, the drive toward togetherness on the part of blacks,
has resulted in a tendency on the part of black sailors to polarize.
This results m a grievance of one black, real or fancied, becoming the
grievance of many. Polarization is an unfortunate trend and negates
efforts since 1048 to integrate the military services and to stamp out
separation. This divisive trend must be reversed.
13. Non military gestures such as "passing the power'' or "dapping"
are disruptive, serve to enhance racial polarization, and should be
discouraged.
14. After the incidents on Kitty Ha irk and Constellation, a meet-
ing was called by the Secretary of the Navy of all of the admirals in
the Washington. IXC., area in which the CNO spoke to the failure of
the Navy to meet its human relations goals. Immediately thereafter,
his remarks were made available to the press and sent as a message to
s:: 066 O— T:i— So. SI 2
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all hands. Because of the wording of the text, it was perceived by
many to be a public admonishment by the CXO of his staff for the
failure to solve racial problems within the Navy. Even though this
was followed within 96 hours by Z-gram 117 which stressed the need
for discipline, the speech itself, the issuance of it to the public press,
and the timing of its delivery, all served to emphasize the CXO's
perception of the Xavy*s problems. Again, concern over racial prob-
lems seemed paramount to the question of good order and discipline
even though there had been incidents on two ships which might be
characterized as "mutinies'". The subcommittee regrets that the tra-
dition of not criticizing seniors in front of their subordinates was
ignored in this case.
1."). The Navy's recruitment program for most of 1972 which re-
sulted in the lowering of standards for enlistment, accepting a greater
percentage of mental category IV and those in the lower half of
category III. not requiring recruits in these categories to have com-
pleted their high school education, and accepting these people with-
out sufficient analysis of their previous offense records, has created
many of the problems the Xavy is experiencing today.
16. The reduction of time in recruit training from 9 to 7 weeks,
thus sending those personnel who do not qualify for advanced train-
ing in "Av schools from the street to the tleet in less than two months,
appears to result in inadequate preparation for shipboard duty.
17. The investigation disclosed an alarming frequency of success-
ful acts of sabotage and apparent sabotage on a wide variety of ships
and stations within the Xavy.
B. OPINIONS
1. The subcommittee is of the opinion that the riot on Kitty Hawk
consisted of unprovoked assaults by a very few men. most of whom
were of below-average mental capacity, most of whom had been
aboard for less than one year, and all of whom were black. This
group, as a whole, acted as "thugs" which raises doubt as to whether
they should ever have been accepted into military service in the first
place.
2. The subcommittee expresses its strong objection to the pro-
cedures utilized by higher authority to negotiate with CoiiteJIation's
dissidents and, eventually, to appease them by acquiescing to their
demands and by meting out minor nonjudicial punishment for what
was a major affront to good order and discipline. Moreover, the sub-
committee stresses that the actions committed aboard that ship have
the potential for crippling a combatant vessel in a war zone.
.'}. The subcommittee believes that advice concerning decisions
which had to be made with regard to Constellation, offered by per-
sonnel in human relations billets to line officers, was uniformly poor.
The decisions, made on the basis of that advice, proved unsuccessful
in bringing the incident to a conclusion.
Later decisions, reflecting a reversal of the policy of negotiation
with the dissident sailors, resulted in the transfer of the men off the
ship in a disciplinary status.
4. The statement that riots, mutinies and acts of sabotage in the
Xavy are a product of "the time" is not valid
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